Context of the Litigation. Subject Matter of the Case

The litigation brought before the court concerns contractual liability in relation to design services and technical verification of the D.A.L.I. documentation, in the context of the performance of a public procurement contract concluded between the Cluj County Prefect Institution and a service provider of design services, regarding the preparation of the Documentation for Approval of Intervention Works (D.A.L.I.), technical expertise, and related studies for the historic monument building “Administrative Palace of Cluj County.”

The case is particularly relevant regarding:

• the statute of limitations of the substantive right of action,
• the moment of accrual of the right to compensation,
• the delimitation between contractual obligations and statutory obligations in the field of construction quality.

Facts as Found by the Courts

Conclusion and Performance of the Services Contract

A services contract was concluded between the Cluj County Prefect Institution and the service provider, assisted by Brisc Legal, having as object:

• the preparation of the Documentation for Approval of Intervention Works (D.A.L.I.);
• drafting of the technical expertise;
• conducting specialty studies (geotechnical, topographical, historical‑architectural).

The contractual deadline for performance was 45 calendar days, and under Article 7.3 of the contract, the contract automatically terminated upon the date of final acceptance. The beneficiary performed acceptance of the documentation without objections.

Subsequently, in the context of the Prefect Institution’s intention to access financing through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan – Component 5 (Renovation Wave), it was considered that the previously prepared D.A.L.I. documentation did not meet all fundamental requirements provided by Law no. 10/1995, and given that nearly two years had passed since the preparation of the initial documentation, and because the new financing program imposed specific requirements, updating the technical expertise was necessary.

As a result:

• the institution concluded separate contracts with other providers, incurring additional costs for supplementary verifications;
• the institution also concluded a second contract with the same provider to update the technical expertise, paying an additional sum;
• following audit controls, in which alleged irregularities were identified, the plaintiff considered that these additional expenses represented damages caused by the contractor’s failure to perform contractual obligations.

Decision of the Court of First Instance – Cluj Tribunal

Admittance of the Exception of Inadmissibility

By the civil judgment of the Cluj Tribunal:

• the exception of prescription was dismissed as unfounded;
• the exception of inadmissibility of the claim was upheld;
• the action of the Prefect Institution was dismissed as inadmissible and unfounded.

The first-instance court found, in essence, that:

• the beneficiary did not use the procedure provided by Article 10.14 of the contract, which allowed for requests for clarifications and additions at no additional cost, considering that the acceptance minutes were signed without objections;
• the additional obligations invoked were not expressly provided in the contract at the time of its performance.

Applicable Legal Framework

Law no. 10/1995 on Construction Quality

Article 5
“Buildings must meet, throughout their entire existence, the following fundamental requirements:
a) structural strength and stability;
b) fire safety;
c) hygiene, health, and environmental protection;
d) safety and accessibility in use;
e) protection against noise;
f) energy efficiency and thermal insulation;
g) sustainable use of natural resources.”

Article 13(2)
“It is prohibited to use technical projects that have not been verified in accordance with the fundamental requirements.”

Civil Procedure Code

Article 472(1)
“The respondent has the right, after the expiry of the appeal term, to file an incidental appeal within the proceedings in which the appeal brought by the opposing party is being adjudicated.”

Article 453
“The party that loses the claim shall be obliged, at the request of the prevailing party, to bear the court costs.”

Reasons for Which the Cluj Court of Appeal Admitted the Incidental Appeal

Statute of Limitations of the Substantive Right of Action

The Court of Appeal noted the applicability of the general three-year statute of limitations provided by Article 2517 of the Civil Code, in the absence of a special term applicable to the legal relationship in question. Under Article 2523 of the Civil Code, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date on which the holder of the right of action knew or, under the circumstances, should have known the accrual of that right.

In this case, the Court found that the first-instance court correctly established the starting point of the limitation period: the date on which the D.A.L.I. documentation was accepted without reservations by the plaintiff, according to the acceptance minutes. At that moment, the services were examined by a commission appointed by the beneficiary, which found them to be in compliance with all contractual requirements, and the contractor had fully met its obligations.

The Court emphasized that the plaintiff should have been aware, as of the date of acceptance, of any potential non-performance or improper performance of contractual obligations, marking the moment of accrual of the substantive right of action.

These findings regarding the commencement of the limitation period were not contested on appeal, thus becoming final. However, the first-instance court dismissed the exception of prescription, arguing that the limitation period had been interrupted by a notification sent by the plaintiff—an aspect that constituted the exclusive object of analysis for the Court of Appeal in the incidental appeal.

Interruption of the Statute of Limitations by Notification: Legal Conditions

Examining the effect of the notification, the Court noted that, under Article 2537(4) of the Civil Code, the statute of limitations is interrupted by any act by which the debtor is put in default, and according to Article 2540 of the Civil Code, such interruption produces effects only if the putting in default is followed by the filing of the claim within six months. Additionally, Article 1522 of the Civil Code provides that putting in default can be made by written notification, provided that it is communicated to the debtor by a means ensuring proof of communication.

Effect of Incorrectly Addressed Notification on the Limitation Period

Applying these provisions, the Court found that the notification invoked by the plaintiff was addressed to a different legal entity—one with a similar name to that of the defendant—a fact not disputed by the parties.

Contrary to the first-instance finding, the Court held that this cannot be considered a mere formal error, even if the notification was sent to the same address and acknowledged by the administrator of the incidental appellant, because the correspondence was not addressed to the true debtor.

The Interruption of the Limitation Period Occurs from the Date of Issuance

Consequently, the Court held that the plaintiff did not prove proper putting in default, and therefore the interruption of the statute of limitations under Article 2537(4) could not be upheld. Moreover, the condition imposed by Article 2540 was not met: the six-month period for filing the claim runs from the date of issuance of the notification, not from the date of receipt by the debtor.

Accordingly, the claim was filed four days after the legal deadline, as the plaintiff erroneously related to the date of receipt rather than issuance. In the absence of a valid cause for interruption, the Court concluded that the limitation period had expired four days prior to the filing of the claim, rendering the action time-barred.

For these reasons, the appellate court found the first-instance solution unlawful, admitted the incidental appeal filed by the service provider, upheld the exception of the statute of limitations of the substantive right of action, and dismissed the claim as time-barred. Consequently, the main appeal was also dismissed.

In these circumstances, the appellate court did not examine the merits of the arguments raised by the Cluj County Prefect Institution in the main appeal.

Conclusion

This ruling analyzes the reasoning of the Cluj Court of Appeal in a case where the contracting authority sought damages related to the performance of a public procurement contract, but the claim was dismissed as time-barred, based on the correct application of Articles 2537(4) and 2540 of the Civil Code.